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“Re-redefining” International Security 
 
BRINGING INTENT BACK IN  
 
NICHOLAS D. ANDERSON 
Georgetown University 
M.A., Security Studies 
 
 
The tectonic geopolitical shifts that have taken place since the end of the Cold War have 
led many to put forth a need to rethink and revise the concept of international security. 
The traditional definition, they assert, is no longer sufficient in the face of the modern 
era’s most pressing security issues and threats. What are and will be the distinguishing 
features of international security problems? What should be considered an international 
security issue, and what should not? How can “international security” or “international 
security issue” be defined to allow academics and policymakers to most capably think 
about and deal with the world they face? Here it is argued that while there is no doubt 
that a revision of the traditional notion of security is in order, it would be wise to avoid 
excessive expansion of the concept. It is also argued that the most appropriate definition 
of an international security threat is one that retains the all-important aspect of human 
agency. Over-broadening of the concept will only lead to a variety of problems for theory 
and policy in the field of international security.1 
 
 
The seismic geopolitical shifts that have taken place since the end of the Cold 
War and the panoply of threats that have ridden in on the most recent wave of 
globalization have led many to challenge the way we think about security (Baldwin 1995, 
118; Buzan 1984, 109; Mathews 1989, 162). Post-World War II definitions, assumptions, 
and security institutions, they assert, are no longer sufficient to deal with the modern 
world’s most pressing security problems. They argue that in order to face the problems of 
the twenty-first century, we need a more comprehensive definition of security—one that 
encompasses the increasing number of threats to an increasing number of actors.  
These calls from prominent voices in the field lead to several critical questions: 
What are and will be the distinguishing features of international security problems in the 
world today and in the future? What should be considered an international security 
problem, and what should not? How can “international security” or “international 
                                                 
1 The author can be contacted at NA334@georgetown.edu. 
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security problem” be defined in a way that allows academics and policymakers to most 
capably think about and deal with the threats of the modern era? This study argues that 
although a revision of the traditional, state-centric, militarily-oriented, and externally-
focused definition of security is no doubt an order, it would be wise to avoid excessive 
expansion of the concept. Along with these necessary conceptual revisions, I argue that 
the most appropriate definition of an international security threat retains the all-important 
aspect of human agency or intent. Over-broadening of the concept will lead only to a 
variety of problems for theory and policy in the field of international security.  
To make this argument, I first examine some of the major changes in the twenty-
first century international security arena. I then trace the evolution of the concept of 
“security,” from the Cold War to today. I follow up with a look at some of the 
implications this new thinking on international security as a concept will have for both 
international relations theory and security studies as academic disciplines, and for the 
practice of foreign and security policy. I then attempt to “re-redefine” the concept, 
bringing the crucial aspects of agency and intentionality back into the definition. The 
study concludes with some of the broader implications of these arguments for 
international security theory and policy, both today and tomorrow. 
 
The Post-Cold War World    
It is difficult to deny that the sweeping changes wrought since the end of the Cold 
War have altered, and will continue to alter, the global geopolitical landscape. 
Conventional, “Great Power” warfare appears in precipitous decline. Global civil society 
seems to be on the rise. In today’s world, it is the international economy that matters most. 
Of these vast and far-reaching shifts, four stand out as fundamental. 
The first is globalization, a notoriously slippery concept that requires elaboration. 
For our purposes here, globalization is defined as the “widening, deepening, and speeding 
up” of economic, political, and social interconnectedness among individuals, groups, 
organizations, states, and other important actors in the international system (Naím 2009, 
28; Brown 2008, 45). Globalization is largely a technology-driven phenomenon—the 
rapid rate of technological change has facilitated this explosion of connection across the 
globe (Naím 2009, 29). ] 
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The definition outlined above consists of three primary aspects: the economic, the 
political, and the social. For one, globalization has been defined by a rapid expansion of 
global economic interconnectedness, with trade, investment, global production, and 
international aid bringing states, organizations, firms, and individuals closer together than 
ever before. And while some argue this is a positive force for peace (Brooks 1999; Koo 
2009), others are less convinced (Barbieri 1996; Barbieri and Schneider 1999; 
Gasiorowski 1986; Rowe 2005).  
Politics is globalized as well, with a rapid proliferation of intergovernmental 
organizations—going from just thirty-seven in 1909 to nearly 1,000 conventional and 
non-conventional organizations today (Kegley jr. and Banton, 2012).2 Here too, there are 
those who argue that such institutions reduce the risk of conflict (Axelrod 2006; 
Ikenberry 2009; Keohane 2005; Nye 2011, 215-217), and those who argue that they are 
epiphenomenal; mere “reflection[s] of the distribution of power” (Mearsheimer 1994/95, 
7).  
Finally there are the social aspects of globalization. The world’s individuals have 
been brought closer together through travel, trade, academic exchange, and the explosive 
growth of transnational nongovernmental organizations. Similarly here, while some argue 
such expansion will lead to greater global harmony (Kaldor 2003), others see it promising 
only greater friction (Barber 1992; Huntington 1993; Lieber and Weisberg 2002). While 
the world has experienced globalization in the past, the current phase is unique in the 
rapidity with which economic liberalization, communication, and integration are taking 
place (Wolf 2001). Some states, such as Belgium and Singapore, have positioned 
themselves to benefit immensely from this trend. While others, such as Burma and Niger, 
are being quickly left behind (KOF 2010).  
The second great shift is what Fareed Zakaria (2009) has termed, “the rise of the 
rest”: the economic emergence of a number of non-Western powers, from Brazil to 
Indonesia, South Africa to Turkey. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the 
Cold War, international relations entered an unprecedented era of unipolarity (Brooks and 
Wohlforth 2008; Jervis 2009; Walt 2009; Wohlforth 2009). The United States’ 
overwhelming dominance in military, political, and economic terms was unmatched in 
                                                 
2 The real number is 989. 247 conventional, 742 nonconventional.  
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human history, and seemed likely to remain so for the foreseeable future (Posen 2003). 
And yet today, according to the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2025 
report, we are witnessing a global shift in relative economic power, “roughly from west 
to east,” and are approaching a truly multipolar economic order (NIC 2008, 7, 12).  
This “rise of the rest” emerged through the profound, sustained growth of the 
global economy, what Zakaria (2009) calls the “big story of our times” (27). Over the 
past four decades, the global economy increased nearly twenty-two fold, going from $2.9 
trillion in 1970 to $63.1 trillion today (World Bank 2012).3 And with this global growth 
we have seen a massive movement for political change, largely in the direction of 
democracy (Fukuyama 1989; Huntington 1991; Inglehart 2000). In 1973, democracies 
comprised only 27 percent of the state system—by 2006 this number had swollen to just 
under 63 percent (Diamond 2007, appendix 2). While most would assume that the United 
States will remain first among equals in this more economically horizontal, democratic 
world, “among equals” is what merits particular emphasis (NIC 2008, 29). 
The third great shift is the changing nature of power, which Joseph Nye (2011, xv) 
characterizes as “a power transition among states and a power diffusion away from all 
states.” While the more-historically-familiar power transition is resulting in an entirely 
different distribution of capabilities (Gilpin 1981; Zakaria 2009), the more-novel power 
diffusion has led some to talk of “shrunken sovereignty” (Barber 2009) and others of a 
reactionary, state-centric “return of history” (Kagan 2008; see also Bremmer 2009). The 
rise of a variety of non-state actors, such as multinational corporations, nongovernmental 
organizations, and terrorist networks, has also led Richard Haass (2008) to describe the 
twenty-first century as the “age of nonpolarity,” one in which many centers of power 
exist that are not—and need not be—nation states. 
Underwriting these three fundamental shifts is a fourth seismic shift concerning 
demographics. We are witnessing massive demographic declines among the richest, most 
industrialized nations, and rapid growth among the demographically youngest, 
economically least-developed, and most conflict-ridden states. The fertility rates in a 
number of countries make this clear. In Japan (GNI/capita $41,850), Singapore ($40,070), 
and Germany ($43,070), fertility rates are 1.39, 0.78, and 1.41 births-per-woman 
                                                 
3 Measured in current U.S. dollars.  
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respectively—well below the replacement rate of 2.1. However, in Mali (GNI/capita 
$600), Somalia ($150), and Afghanistan ($410), fertility rates sit at 6.35, 6.25, and 5.64, 
leading to “youth bulges” in the countries that are least prepared to deal with them (CIA 
2012; World Bank 2012).4  
These two demographic trends are coupled with a great global urbanization 
movement, with approximately 70 percent of the global population estimated to be urban 
by 2025 (Goldstone 2010, 38). While roughly a century ago the ‘global cities’ were 
London, Paris, and New York, today urban centers like Karachi, Kinshasa, Lagos, and 
Dhaka have exceeded or are creeping towards 10 million residents, putting enormous 
strain on local resources and infrastructure. The combination of high fertility rates, mass 
migration, and urbanization among some of the poorest global societies could have 
explosive consequences in some of the world’s most volatile regions. While some argue 
that this fourth shift will be a force for “Great Power peace” in the modern era (Haas 
2007), others are less sanguine about its implications for the developing world 
(Goldstone 2008, 36-38). 
These four great shifts and the end of the multi-decade global ideological standoff 
that defined the latter half of the twentieth century produced three important changes in 
how we conceptualize international security. First, theorists and practitioners now tend to 
think of security internationally, recognizing that much of the modern world is defined 
by complex political, economic, and social interdependence (Baldwin 1995, 131). Gone 
are the days when “national security” was the primary concern of states, and stable 
borders the primary goal. In the current context, threats seem to emanate not merely from 
without, but also from within. They can affect multiple states at once and can require 
complex forms of cooperation. 
Second, military might is declining in importance, with the modern era showing a 
steady drop in interstate war and a sharp increase in intrastate conflict (Call and Cousens 
2008, 5; Harbom and Wallensteen 2009, 578-579; Mathews 1997, 51; Ripsmand and 
Paul 2008, 36). From the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 to the ceasefire that unofficially 
ended the Korean War in 1953, no less than 129 wars and major interventions took place, 
with “territory” being the defining cause of most (Holsti 1991, 48-49, 85-88, 140-144, 
                                                 
4 All GNI statistics from (World Bank 2012); all fertility rate statistics from (CIA 2012). 
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214-218, 274). Yet since this time, no two great powers have engaged in violent conflict 
with one another on a scale befitting the term “war” (Sarkees and Wayman 2010).5  
Simultaneously, war has gone from the being primarily the province of developed 
states to increasingly being an occurrence among and within states in the developing 
world. As Fearon and Laitin (2003) point out, between the end of WWII and the turn of 
the century, the number of civil war dead exceeded that of interstate war by a factor of 
five, with 16.2 million casualties. Moreover, from 1989 to 2008, minor conflicts made up 
63% of all global armed conflicts; 94% being some variation of intrastate conflict 
(Harbom and Wallensteen 2009, 578).  
This increase in intrastate conflict has led to the rise in the importance of peace 
operations as a tool for dealing with global conflict (Daniel 2008, 2). Theory and practice 
in the areas of peacekeeping (Call and Cousens 2008), peace-building (Doyle and 
Sambanis 2000), and conflict mediation (Zartman 2000) have seen great advances since 
the end of the Cold War. With this, we have seen global militaries reduce in size, going 
from 28 million in 1985 to 19.8 million by 2006. Complementing this trend has been a 
massive increase in non-military tools of statecraft such as the use of economic sanctions, 
up 50% from the 1980s to the 1990s (Ripsman and Paul 2008). 
Finally, nuclear deterrence and the role of nuclear strategy have declined 
markedly. Since the Soviet Union shook the world with its first nuclear test in 1949, 
academics, politicians, and interested citizens have concerned themselves with the 
“balance of terror” between the U.S. and its Soviet rival (Wohlstetter 1959). Scholarship 
describing the “nuclear revolution” (Jervis 1989) that took place and the importance of 
nuclear deterrence (Schelling 2008) dominated the field of security studies. Although 
there is still important work being done on these more traditional topics (Lieber and Press 
2006), the broader dialogue on international security seems to have shifted from states 
with the most power to those with the least.  
With most modern nuclear threats coming from “failing” nuclear states (such as 
Pakistan) and “rogue” nuclear or emerging nuclear states, (such as North Korea and Iran), 
some even argue that great power arms control is essentially irrelevant (Bohlen 2003). 
                                                 
5 This is, of course, according to the criteria set out by the Correlates of War database of at least 1000 battle 
deaths and at least 100 on either side.  
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With the receding importance of problems of strength, such as great power nuclear 
deterrence and the rising threat of problems of weakness, such as “loose nukes” and 
collapsing nuclear states, we have witnessed a resurgence of the nuclear abolitionist 
movement, most recently exemplified by President Obama’s “commitment to seek the 
peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons” (Obama 2009). And while few 
can disagree with the laudability of his goals, there are some who question their 
practicability (Joffe and Davis 2011; Lieber and Press 2009; Tertrais 2010). 
 
Definition and Redefinition  
Given these four fundamental shifts, and their corresponding effects on the 
international security landscape, we now need to look at what is meant by “international 
security,” and of what international security issues consist, to see if a redefinition of the 
term is in order. The importance of this exercise is difficult to overstate, for as Robert 
Jervis (2009, 160) notes, “the best definitions do a great deal of theoretical work.” In its 
most basic form, security is simply the absence of physical harm or the threat of physical 
harm. Security is gradational rather than dichotomous: you can have neither perfect 
security, nor perfect insecurity, only security by varying degrees (Baldwin 1997, 15; 
Caldwell and Williams, Jr. 2006, 2). Security and insecurity also have objective and 
subjective aspects: things can at times appear more threatening to one’s security than they 
are in reality, and at times less, leading some to label them as “socially constructed” 
concepts (Caldwell and Williams, Jr. 2006, 1). Security also involves, and in fact requires, 
a threat; and threats, in the traditional-security-sense, are made up of a combination of the 
capability and intent to do harm or enact violence (Baldwin 1997, 15; Caldwell and 
Williams, Jr., 2006, 9). Tacking “international” onto the front of the concept of security 
simply broadens the scope, referring to threats that have inter-national, multi-national, or 
trans-national implications. Finally, the concept of international security requires what 
Barry Buzan (1991, 3-5) refers to as a “referent object,” an agent that is being threatened. 
This final requirement of a threatened agent brings us to the familiar issue of levels of 
analysis in international relations theory: the focus on individuals, families, minority or 
majority groups, organizations, states, or the entire state system (Waltz 2001). What the 
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threats consist of and who is being threatened have important implications for the 
definition of international security.  
Traditionally, the concept of security has been most closely associated with 
“national security,” namely, external military threats to the nation state (Ayoob 1995, 4-
8). Over time, however, the limitations of this definition grew glaringly apparent. By 
defining threats solely in terms of foreign militaries, one misses out on the vast number of 
nonmilitary threats of the modern era, such as terrorist groups, transnational criminal 
organizations, piracy networks, and the like. Further, if the threatened agent is defined 
simply in terms of the nation state, one ignores the fact that threats and violence can be 
directed exclusively at certain groups, classes, families, and even individuals within states, 
and can, in many cases, emanate from the state itself (Caldwell and Williams, Jr., 2006, 
8).  
Considering these problems, security theorists have called for a “broadening” of 
what constitutes a security threat, and an “extending” or a “deepening” of who can be 
considered “threatened” (Caldwell and Williams, Jr., 2006, 7; Paris 2001, 97). With 
regards to who can justifiably be considered a threatened agent, it seems only reasonable 
to allow extension down to the individual. It is not lost on anyone, for instance, that the 
North Korean and Syrian governments are far greater threats to their own people than any 
foreign military. But the issue of broadening the scope of security threats is a somewhat 
more complicated task, largely because of the simple question of where it stops.  
As stated above, threats have traditionally been thought to comprise some 
combination of the capability and intent to do harm, both being required to constitute a 
threat. New paradigms of security studies, however, have tended to eliminate this 
important element of intent or agency, and have generated a variety of threats that lack 
this crucial qualification. For example, through a process Copenhagen School IR theorists 
refer to as “securitization” (Wæver 1995; Williams 2003), environmental decline, natural 
disasters, poverty, deadly diseases, and resource scarcity should all be considered grave 
threats to international security (Kahl 2006; Mathews 1989; Podesta and Ogden 2007-
2008; McInnes and Rushton 2010; Yergin 2006). Many of these types of ideas fall under 
the broad umbrella of “human security” studies, a term coined by the 1994 UN Human 
Development Report. The report outlined what are now seen as the seven fundamental 
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elements of human security: economic security, health security, food security, 
environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security (UN 
1995). But as Roland Paris cleverly quips, “if human security is all these things, what is it 
not?” (Paris 2001, 92). 
 
Implications for Theory and Policy 
Buzan (1984, 125) refers to “security” as “an essentially contested concept,” 
meaning that it can’t and shouldn’t be strictly defined, for to do so undermines its 
durability and versatility as a term. But as noted above, rather than undercutting its utility, 
a narrower definition of security is necessary for sound theoretical and practical work in 
the field of security studies. What the unwelcome consequences of an expansive security 
concept might be, and how the concept can be reasonably and usefully circumscribed, is 
what will guide the remainder of this article. 
On the academic side, there are four initial problems to consider. First, too broad 
a definition for ‘security’ in security studies will erode the coherence of the discipline. If 
“international security” is an umbrella term that captures too many disparate elements, it 
will be rendered essentially indistinguishable from international political economy, 
international development, global health studies, or international law and global 
governance (Caldwell and Williams, Jr., 2006, 15; Walt 1991, 213). Without clear 
demarcation lines, it will be difficult for scholars to tell what, exactly, they should be 
studying (Paris 2001, 93). Defining security studies in such broad strokes would water 
down the expertise each field requires, and would make training in the subfields largely 
impracticable.  
Second, this expansive definition will hinder scholarly communication, leading 
academics to talk past each other, rather than to each other (Baldwin 1997, 5). If 
“security” refers to that of states, economies, communities, genders, individuals, 
healthcare systems, food distribution networks, and political groupings, scholarly 
discourse in the field will be reduced to a perpetual “dialogue of the deaf,” or as Lake 
(2011, 472) puts it, “an intellectual Tower of Babel.”6 While the boundaries are no doubt 
                                                 
6 Though Lake is referring to the use of paradigms, or “isms,” in IR, not the concept of security.  
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fuzzy, somewhat clearly circumscribed concepts in social science enable us to mostly 
speak the same language, most of the time. 
Thirdly, human security, nontraditional security, and other, more expansive 
concepts, also contain many aspects that are inherently difficult to operationalize. This 
doesn’t completely refute their importance as phenomena worthy of study in social 
science, but it is undoubtedly a challenge for these emerging fields. The concern is, given 
their relative abundance of “social facts” like threatened “identity security” or “cultural 
security,” whether it would be possible for human security theorists to effectively 
validate or invalidate hypotheses (Baldwin 1997, 5; Paris 2001, 3). A more clearly 
defined field will enable scholars to separate and test individual elements, and avoid the 
problems of endogeneity that the grab-bag method seems to invite. This, in turn, will 
allow academic debate and discussion to take place on a more equitable and mutually 
discernible level, sharpening all of our analyses and insights.  
A fourth and final concern for academia is that security studies will be 
fundamentally altered by this new wave of theories and theorists, and will be left 
unrecognizable to its core experts (Levy 1999, 40). If the field of security studies is no 
longer centrally concerned with the causes of war, alliance politics, deterrence, arms 
races and control, the use and control of force, terrorism, and ethnic and nationalist 
conflict, and instead becomes the study of poverty, of demographics, of environmental 
change, and of global health, the voices that have brought the subfield thus far will be 
entirely drowned out. Key texts, such as The Peloponnesian War, Arms and Influence, 
Man, the State, and War, and War and Change in World Politics will go unread, and the 
foundation of the discipline will disappear. 
Thus, for problems of coherence, communication, operationalization, and the 
protection of its core principles, the concept of security and the field of security studies 
would likely not be well served by excessive broadening. And while new, expansive 
human security concepts pose the above-mentioned problems for academia, they have 
even graver implications for the security policy community. In addition to the practical 
problems of communication outlined above, there are five additional problems for the 
policy community. 
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First, too expansive a definition for security would make comparing similar 
policies essentially impossible, and distinguishing between different policy options 
inherently difficult (Baldwin 1997, 6). Take, for instance, the types of discussions 
surrounding counterinsurgency versus counterterrorism policies for the war in 
Afghanistan, with counterinsurgency being more people-centered and counterterrorism 
being more threat-centered. It is important to note that both are centrally concerned with 
security. But security for whom? And security from what? This is where a catchall 
security concept becomes problematic, for those advocating different positions will, in 
effect, be arguing for the same thing. And those making these ominous, life-and-death 
decisions will be left without the requisite clarity to make prudent, rational, and at times 
moral, judgments. 
Secondly, the human security concept has a bearing on bureaucratic questions 
concerning areas and responsibilities. Should we expect, for instance, the Department of 
Defense to be putting together climate change legislation proposals or running HIV/AIDS 
relief centers?  Conversely, would it be wise to have the State Department, USAID, or the 
U.S. Geological Survey conducting operational planning? This isn’t to say that there 
shouldn’t be cross-departmental collaboration and exchange, for today’s most complex 
security problems are often too much to handle for any one department alone. But these 
different agencies are designed, funded, and staffed according to different criteria and for 
different purposes. While more holistic approaches are undoubtedly necessary, a more 
clearly circumscribed security concept will help ensure that agency overlap won’t lead to 
detrimental results. 
Third, unlike academics, policymakers are tasked with the difficult requirement of 
allocating resources. Considering these requirements, if everything is a security threat, it 
is difficult to set priorities or single out areas of particular concern (Koblentz 2010, 108; 
Paris 2001, 92). If we conceive of such disparate issues as deficit spending, illegal 
immigration, the H1N1 virus, and the receding Arctic ice cap as “vital” security threats, 
right alongside the rise of China in Asia, Iranian nuclear proliferation, and al Qaeda 
training camps, knowing what matters when will be next-to-impossible.  
Fourth, if what constitutes a security problem or security threat is too broad, 
problems will be subject to incompatible policy solutions that could undercut each other, 
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or will be paralyzed by competing demands, relegating them to lowest-common-
denominator compromises (Koblentz 2010, 108). At the best of times, as the bureaucratic 
politics literature points out, this “pulling and hauling” in inter- and intra-agency battle 
leads to less-than-optimal outcomes, generally far from what would be decided upon 
according to more rational calculation (Allison 1969). If the meaning of what is being 
battled over lacks consensus, and the means to solve such problems come from every 
different direction, matters will be made far worse. 
Finally and perhaps most importantly, it is worth pointing out that security threats 
are used to justify the suspension of civil liberties, waging war, and legitimizing the 
reallocation of vast resources. In many cases, this is a necessary cost for maintaining 
security and part of the burden we must bear as citizens and members of democratic 
societies. And yet, even in the healthiest of democracies, we would be ill advised to 
provide the government an exponentially expanding list of “vital” security threats to 
protect against (Baldwin 1997, 8; Caldwell and Williams, Jr., 2006, 12). One can easily 
see how this is a potential first step on the road toward an Orwellian world much like that 
described in 1984: Oceania being at war with Eurasia, and having always been at war 
with Eurasia (Orwell 2004). 
 
“Re-redefinition”: Bringing Intent Back In   
How then, are we to define international security and what should be categorized 
as international security threats? Arguably, the most intelligent way of narrowing the 
definition of international security is to accept the wide variety of possible threatened 
agents, but to restrict allowable threats to those with international implications that 
include the fundamental aspect of human agency or intent. This circumscription of the 
concept will help avoid many of the critical theoretical and policy problems outlined 
above. Furthermore, it is important to distinguish between tangible international security 
problems and what might be termed “latent security problems.” Adherents to the human 
security paradigm may argue that this distinction is not worth making, but it is important 
to recognize that nearly anything can have international security implications if the causal 
chain is drawn long enough. A useful rule of thumb is the more deliberate an 
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international threat, the more justifiably it can be classified as a security issue (Caldwell 
and Williams, Jr., 2006, 11).   
Under this definition then, many of the modern era’s purported rising 
“nontraditional threats” (Mathews 1997, 51) do not necessarily merit classification as 
international security problems. Rather than being vital security issues in and of 
themselves, those that exclude the important aspect of human agency are better classified 
as “latent.” Climate change in the developing world, for instance, promises to bring food 
and water shortages, catastrophic natural disasters, deadly disease, mass human migration, 
and resource competition (Podesta and Ogden 2007-2008, 116). And yet, while it 
certainly poses an international threat, it does not merit classification as a vital security 
threat in itself, because of the absence of intent. Deadly infectious diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS or the Avian flu are another such example. While they are clearly important 
problems posing potentially grave threats to individuals around the globe, classifying 
them as threats to international security will only cloud the necessary clarity needed to 
think and act intelligently in dealing with these problems (McInnes and Rushton 2010, 
225).  
A great number of other examples that are often raised, such as poverty, economic 
recession, drug abuse, declining natural resources, and rapid urbanization and population 
growth, simply are what they are, and are not definitively vital issues of international 
security. While each has the potential to lead to serious international problems, even 
security problems, they are simply too many steps removed from posing a direct security 
threat to states, governments, militaries, communities, and individuals in the international 
system.  
A number of today’s oft-cited threats to international security, on the other hand, 
are rightly categorized as such. The traditional issues of interstate conflict, military 
threats, arms races, nuclear deterrence, and contestation of the commons obviously 
continue to fit the definition. Some of the more-recent threats, too, such as nuclear 
proliferation among “rogue” and weak states (Litwak 2007), increased international 
piracy, expanding organized crime rings, and international terrorism (Byman 2008; 
Cronin 2006; Roberts 2005) all include human agency and have international 
implications, therefore befitting the classification as international security problems.  
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Even many emerging threats can be considered as such. Cyber-threats, for 
instance, fit this classification if they are carried out with the intent to threaten the state, 
its military, or its people (Diebert and Rohozinski 2010). For example, Chinese hackers 
stealing trade secrets is not an international security issue, whereas cyber-penetration of 
classified intelligence files or online terrorist recruitment and funding are. Biosecurity 
threats, too, can be justifiably classified as international security problems, but only if 
they include the fundamental issue of intent. Bio-warfare, bio-terrorism, malicious dual-
use biological research, and bio-crime with violent intent or consequences are all obvious 
threats to international security. Laboratory accidents, pandemic and epidemic diseases, 
and agricultural blights, on the other hand, are not (Koblentz 2008, 111).7   
Admittedly, the lines are not nearly as clear as they have been made out to be here. 
Issues like military accidents, inadvertent missile launches, and abandoned mine fields fit 
within a grey area between tangible and potential international security problems. But 
these problems, among many others, can still be traced back to the key concept of intent. 
Militaries, missiles, and landmines are created and maintained with the intent of deterring, 
threatening, or even harming governments, militaries, communities, and individuals, and 
although the harms they may happen to commit may not be intentional on given 
occasions, they still carry with them this important aspect of intentionality. And so an 
accidental nuclear weapon detonation should certainly be considered a true international 
security problem, but nuclear reactor accidents, even meltdowns, no matter how 
threatening, should not. 
 
Conclusion 
Based on this narrower definition of international security and more stringent 
designation of international security problems, what are some lessons for international 
security theory and policy going forward? Three, I would argue, are preeminent. First, 
this study highlights the importance of recognizing and understanding the causal chain 
that leads to international security problems. There is no doubt that an earthquake can 
lead to a breakdown of social order, leading then to lawlessness, looting, and violence. 
Similarly, carbon emissions resulting in global climate change have proven to lead to 
                                                 
7 See Koblentz’s “Taxonomy of Biological Threats.” 
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water shortages in the more arid parts of the world, and violent, inter- and intrastate 
conflicts have already been waged over this declining critical resource. And yet the 
earthquake and the emissions are not security threats in and of themselves, they are 
simply the independent variables that can set the causal chain towards insecurity in 
motion. This understanding will help us think of how to preempt security issues with 
other tools of statecraft, such as aid or diplomacy, before they arise.  
Second, the obvious benefit of cross-disciplinary academic and interagency 
governmental exchange is clear. On the academic side, security studies experts could gain 
immensely from the knowledge of epidemiologists, climatologists, and nuclear or 
biological scientists, and vice-versa. For those in the policy community, members of the 
Department of Defense or the Central Intelligence Agency, too, have a lot they can 
potentially learn from USAID, State Department, and Department of Health and Human 
Services staff-members—but they should not be trying to do each other’s jobs.  
Finally, this study points to the fact that perhaps what needs changing is not the 
definition of international security per se, but rather our tendency to see security issues as 
being far more important than all other considerations. We need to resist the knee-jerk 
reaction we have when politicians call HIV/AIDS, the swelling budget deficit, or the state 
of the education system, “threats to our national security,” and think about allocating 
resources to preempt the real threats before they truly emerge. Clear thinking and sharp 
definitional lines surrounding the concept of international security will only lead to the 
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